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Abstract
Academic and policy debates over climate change risks and policies have stimulated
economic research in a variety of fields.  In this article I briefly discuss eight overlapping
areas of current research in which further effort particularly is warranted.  These areas include
decision criteria for policy; risk assessment and adaptation; uncertainty and learning;
abatement cost and the innovation and diffusion of technology; and the credibility of policies
and international agreements.  Further analysis in these areas not only will advance academic
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Academic and policy debates over the risks of climate change and the appropriate
policy responses have led to an enormous and continuing outpouring of literature in the past
10 years.  Fields that have spurred on include computable general equilibrium analysis;
theoretical and empirical dynamic optimization models with accumulative pollutants;
noncooperative and cooperative game theory; econometric and simulation models of energy
supply and demand; the economics of innovation; analyses of incentive-based emissions
control policies; applied micro studies of numerous market and nonmarket values
potentially affected by climate change; and intertemporal social welfare theory.  The
literature devoted to climate change issues has ranged from highly abstract to immediately
relevant for policymakers.
In what follows I briefly discuss eight overlapping areas of current research in the
economics of climate change in which further effort particularly is warranted.  These areas
include decision criteria for policy; risk assessment and adaptation; uncertainty and
learning; abatement cost and the innovation and diffusion of technology; and the credibility
of policies and international agreements.  Because these categories blur so easily, I have
not attempted to create any sort of formal taxonomy.  The issues covered are both empirical
and theoretical.  The discussion not only is inherently idiosyncratic, but it is also broad
rather than deep.  I am not an expert in many of the areas identified below, but I have had
to draw upon the literature addressing these subjects in formulating policy analyses both in
and out of government.  From that perspective, I pursue a dual concern for the state of basic
knowledge and the capacity of such knowledge to shed light on actual policy decisions.
The references provided are meant to be illustrative rather than to provide a definitive
bibliography.
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1. ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS:  PUBLIC CONCERN AND DECISION
FRAMEWORKS1
A variety of "integrated assessment" (IA) models have been developed to assess (at
varying levels of crudeness) the potential damages of climate change and costs of abatement,
and to highlight emissions paths that minimize the present value sum of damage and control
costs.  These models essentially are dynamic benefit-cost tools.  For the most part, current IA
models indicate that cost-minimizing emissions paths rise through much of the next century
(Manne 1996).  This time pattern sharply contrasts with both the significant short-term
emissions reductions for industrialized nations envisaged in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the
aspirations of many environmentalists to stabilize long-term atmospheric GHG concentrations
at a reasonably low level compared to business as usual.
A lively debate has ensued about the extent to which the conclusions of IA models are
driven by the use of a present value (discounted utilitarian) criterion for evaluating risks and
responses.  IA models are sensitive not just to the level of the discount rate (Azar and Sterner
1996), but also more generally to the form of the intergenerational welfare functional
(Howarth 1996).
The specification of decision criteria for assessing climate change risks and response
costs involves a deep and longstanding philosophical debate that may never be resolved.  The
debate can be seen in the discussion of decision criteria in the Second Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (see, in particular, Munasinghe et al. 1996).
Attempts to limit consideration of tradeoffs, as with either an absolute "precautionary
principle" for emissions control targets or an absolute cap on abatement costs, seem
fundamentally unsatisfactory because they do not recognize the opportunity costs of actions
taken or not taken.2  Yet, a simple discounted net benefits criterion does not do justice to
concerns about intergenerational equity, even if one successfully assessed all the risks and
costs including option values associated with irreversible changes (Lind 1995; Toman 1994).
One way to frame the question that retains a utilitarian but altruistic perspective is to
ask how willing the present generation is to incur costs (today and in their own future) in
order to provide some uncertain but identifiable set of reduced climate change risks for people
in the future.  In this approach, the stream of abatement costs over time is discounted as with
any assessment of intertemporal opportunity cost.3  However, one does not simply apply the
                                               
1 The discussion in this section and the next one overlaps (and has benefited from a reading of) the paper by
Azar (1998).
2 This same criticism applies to the "tolerable windows" approach (see, e.g., Toth et al. 1997), which seeks to
identify limits on short-term and long-term GHG emissions prior to (or in some cases to the exclusion of)
considering abatement costs.  One could modify the approach by also including dimensions of the tolerable
window that reflect abatement costs, but this is still fundamentally ad hoc.  At a minimum, one would want to
assess the shadow cost of each of the constraints that define a window (see, e.g., Yohe 1997) and ask if the
results delivered at the margin justify the cost.
3 This is still difficult in practice, given uncertainties about the shadow price of capital and the social rate of time
preference (see, e.g., Lind 1982, 1990; Azar and Sterner 1996).Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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same discounting procedure to evaluate changes in expected future risks from climate change.
Instead, these changes in future risk are treated as benefits reaped by the current generation,
and their value reflects the marginal rate of substitution for the current generation between
their own welfare and the potential welfare of future generations (Schelling 1995; Toman
forthcoming).  This approach seems more consistent with individual preferences (broadly
defined to include equity issues) than simply setting a low social discount rate for climate
change analysis to reflect intergenerational equity concerns, as described for example in the
IPCC Second Assessment (Arrow et al. 1996; see also Manne 1995, and Toth 1995 for
discussion of intergenerational equity).
In practice, however, implementing this approach will not be easy.  The rate of
substitution might be assessed through a contingent valuation referendum as described by
Kopp and Portney (1997), though these authors readily acknowledge the methodological
challenges of the idea.  At a minimum one would seek to provide some improved
characterization of the time paths of future avoided damages under different scenarios (and
their associated uncertainties) as part of the political processes underlying the formulation of
climate change policies.  There are also questions about how best to represent uncertainty
about climate change risks (see below) in the decision criteria.  The standard approach of
expected utility theory has been criticized, particularly when there are low-probability
extreme events (see, e.g., Camerer and Kunreuther 1989), but no widely accepted alternatives
yet have emerged.  Further empirical (and multidisciplinary) work to understand the nature of
intergenerational stewardship concerns involving climate change, vis-à-vis other current and
future concerns, would be very useful.
2. UNCERTAINTY, THE TIMING OF ABATEMENT, AND INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT
Many analyses of climate change risks look at a combination of modeling and
judgmental "best estimates" for the degree of climate change, the potential impacts on natural
and human systems, and the associated socioeconomic consequences.  This approach is
exemplified in the literature on climate change damages summarized in the IPCC Second
Assessment (Pearce et al. 1996).  In actuality, of course, all these links in the chain are
uncertain, and the presence of this uncertainty has complex implications for timing of GHG
emissions reduction and the policy tools employed.  These implications are beginning to be
better understood, but more research is needed to bring them fully into the light.
One important element is nonlinearities in the damage function.  Yohe (1993) and Tol
(1995) show that nonlinearities increase estimates of social damage when one takes into
account the tails of the distribution of potential impact, and thus argue for more stringent
control than an analysis based on single point estimates of damages.  Peck and Teisberg
(1993a, 1993b) draw a similar conclusion, while showing that the value of improved
information about the curvature of the damage function is substantially larger than the value
of improved information about its overall scale.  However, these authors find that uncertainty
has very little effect on the pace of near-term emissions reductions.  This result followsMichael Toman RFF 98-32
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because in their analysis, as in most IA models, the rate of emissions control which minimizes
the present value of damage and response costs is quite low for a long time.  This in turn
reflects both low estimates of near-term damages and the effect of discounting in reducing the
present value of longer-term damages.
Another source of uncertainty is the prospect of extreme events, which can raise the
costs of climate change even if there are not strong nonlinearities in the damage function.  The
survey of IA model results by Manne (1996) considers the possibility of both levels of
warming and degrees of socioeconomic damage well above the base cases used in the models.
As expected, abatement should be more aggressive in these cases, but the strengthening of
near-term abatement is significant only with the compound effect of both highly adverse
warming and large socioeconomic damages.  Gjerde et al. (1997) present an analysis of
endogenous catastrophe (on the order of a Great Depression) based on cumulative emissions
growth.  They too show that a more conservative emissions path and thus more aggressive
abatement are indicated, but even a fairly substantial long-term catastrophe risk will not have
much of an impact on the desired emissions path in the short to medium term unless the
discount rate is low.  Additional research on the consequences of different catastrophe
representations would be useful.
Pizer (1996) shows that when one incorporates uncertainty about key parameters in an
IA model, the result is more aggressive abatement leading to an emissions path that grows
more slowly and turns down sooner.  This result also basically reflects asymmetries in the loss
function which give rise to an option value for reduced emissions, given the quasi-irreversible
long-term nature of climate change.  Pizer finds that uncertainty about the social discount rate
is particularly important, a finding consistent with the studies cited above.
Concerns about uncertainty and irreversibility lead in turn to issues related to learning
about both climate change risks and response options.  A number of studies (e.g., Manne and
Richels 1992; Peck and Teisberg 1993a; Chao 1995) find that the value of improved
information, which would allow more precise targeting of GHG policy, is substantial.4  Since
gathering better information takes time, these analyses can be interpreted as providing a
further rationale for slower emissions reduction ("learn then act" versus "act then learn").
One possible criticism of this approach is that it downplays the cost of irreversible
actions.  The basic theory of irreversibility (e.g., Arrow and Fisher 1974) indicates that lower
levels of irreversible commitment--which in this case could be interpreted as reduced growth
in the atmospheric concentration of GHGs--is desirable when it is possible to gain knowledge
in the future about future risks and costs.  This argument has been advanced by, among others,
Chichilnisky and Heal (1993).
                                               
4 The gains are especially large if one hypothesizes that the political process generates policies that are very
different than what is considered to be optimal in the models (for example, significant near-term emissions
reductions as envisaged in the Kyoto Protocol versus much more gradual abatement).  As already indicated,
however, the optimality of emissions reduction paths generated by IA models and thus the gains to better
information which might direct policy onto a "better" path are dependent on the nature of climate change risks
and the weighting of different generations' welfare levels.Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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Several studies explicitly incorporate learning to address these issues.  Ulph and Ulph
(1997) argue that the irreversibility effect could in principle go either way, but their modeling
analysis tends to indicate the desirability of less short-term emissions control.  Torvanger
(1997) shows that the effect depends on the nature of the risk (constant versus positively
related to cumulative emissions).  Kolstad's (1996) analysis includes Bayesian learning and
costly commitment to capital investments (introducing an irreversibility on the response side
as well as the environmental side).  He finds that there is little need for short-term concern
about climatic risks, since erroneously slow emissions reductions most likely can be made up
later, but there is a problem of making excessively hasty fixed investments to reduce GHG
emissions in the face of uncertainty about their usefulness (a conclusion in keeping with the
analysis of "real options" of Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  In evaluating these results, it is
important to keep in mind the influence of discounting, which makes the effective time
horizon for evaluating consequences shorter and reduces the importance of long-term
irreversibility in the climate system.5
The preceding arguments connect to a larger debate over the optimal timing of GHG
reduction, a debate that has often considered uncertainty only implicitly.  Regardless of how
one establishes long-term policy goals for GHGs--based, for example, on cost-benefit analysis
in an IA model or some other basis for establishing a long-term target for GHG emissions--
there are several economic reasons for favoring some delay of emissions reduction.  In studies
that analyze the least-cost path to achieve a fixed long-term atmospheric concentration of
GHGs (as opposed to an endogenous target in the full IA models), early delay is offset by
more aggressive emission reduction in the future (see, e.g., Richels and Edmonds 1995,
Wigley, Edmonds, and Richels 1996, Richels et al. 1996, Manne and Richels 1997).  The
rationales for this "backloading" include not just the ability to postpone and thereby reduce
the present value of response costs, but also the ability to turn over the capital stock more
slowly and thus with less cost, and the ability to embody better new technologies and energy
sources in replacement investments.
In practice, issues of intertemporal credibility arise in implementing such a
backloading approach, as discussed below.  Here I focus on other counterarguments (see, e.g.,
Grubb et al. 1995, Hourcade and Robinson 1996, Grubb 1997, and Ha-Duong et al. 1997).
Critics of this approach note that it may increase, not decrease, the expected long-term cost of
GHG abatement.  This would occur if delay allows more "lock-in" of long-lived capital based
on GHG-intensive technologies; retard the development of new technologies that would be
                                               
5 These analyses all consider risk-neutral decisionmakers.  The impact of risk aversion will depend on the nature
of the risk, for example the distinction between a risk that grows over time (and thus could act like a higher
discount rate in increasing current emissions), and the risk of catastrophe that is increased by higher rapid
emissions.  Parry (1993) finds that even if decisionmakers are modeled as being risk-averse, an "insurance
motive" for stronger short-term GHG reductions is quite weak unless the discount rate is very low.  Eismont and
Welsch (1996) introduce a concept of "ambiguity" related to the modification of existing judgments about
climate change risks, and show that ambiguity aversion (broadly comparable to risk aversion with fixed
probabilities) leads to more stringent emissions control.Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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spurred by near-term abatement policies (at least those that are incentive-based); and expose
the economy to the risk of having to make costly rapid future decreases in GHGs in the face
of investment and technological inertia if future scientific analyses revise upwards the risks of
climate change.  Advocates of backloading in turn reply that taking gradual steps on a long-
term road toward significant GHG limits will provide early incentives for investments that
help deter lock-in; that support for R&D (see below) can help offset a shortfall in induced
innovation; and that the cost savings from a more gradual approach are so large that some risk
of rapid future action is justified.  These points of dispute highlight the points of clarification
needed from future research.
Last but not least, bringing uncertainty more fully into climate change analysis also is
useful in considering policy design.  For example, Pizer (1997) extends the classic Weitzman
(1974) prices versus quantities analysis to a dynamic assessment of climate change policies.
He finds that given uncertainty about abatement cost and a relatively flatter marginal damage
cost schedule compared to abatement cost, emissions taxes are likely to yield higher expected
social welfare than quantity controls (implemented with tradable emission permits).6  This
finding has important implications especially in the United States, where environmentalists'
concerns for firm emissions control goals have combined with a broad political aversion to
energy taxes to make an emissions trading program the leading method for implementing the
Kyoto Protocol.  One useful extension of the analysis would be to bring in the risk of
catastrophe discussed above, which is absent in Pizer's current model but would likely swing
the balance somewhat back toward a quantity-based approach.
3. ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
INFRASTRUCTURE
It goes almost without saying that improved understanding of the risks posed by
climate change is crucial for formulating well-designed long-term strategies.  A great deal of
interdisciplinary work is addressing these issues (see, e.g., IPCC 1998 for a recent
contribution).  In evaluating efforts to improve our understanding of risks, I would underscore
the importance of incorporating a socioeconomic perspective.
This point is especially important in considering potential adaptation to the risks of
climate change.  Most observers acknowledge that some degree of adaptation to a changed
climate will be inevitable.  Yet, adaptation potential and adaptation policy to some extent
have been orphan stepchildren in the debate over climate change.  This is due in part to the
nature of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which effectively relegates
adaptation to a national versus international issue, as well as to the ongoing political struggles
over abatement targets.  It is also due to the fact that analysis of adaptation requires analysis
                                               
6 Pizer (1997) considers only regulation of the rate of GHG emissions, but very preliminary extensions of that
framework suggest that the findings extend (with some limits) to a situation in which one is regulating GHG
concentrations (personal communication).  One interesting unanswered question in this context is the extent to
which the results would be affected by the introduction of declining near-term marginal benefits from reductions
in conventional pollutants as a byproduct of effort to cut GHG emissions.Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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of specific kinds of assets used for specific purposes in specific places, as opposed to the use
of stylized aggregate models for abatement cost analysis.
Analyses of the risks and costs of climate change that do not adequately allow for
potential adaptation of informed and motivated economic actors necessarily will come to
biased conclusions.  This seems to be the case, for example, with the estimates of economic
damages summarized in the IPCC Second Assessment (Pearce et al. 1996).  Several studies
that largely postdate the literature underlying the IPCC assessment illustrate the potential for
adaptation (including reduction of other stresses on resource systems) to lower the cost of
climate change in connection with agriculture, forestry, and water resources (Crosson 1989,
Mendelsohn et al. 1994, Reilly 1995, Frederick et al. 1997, Sohngen et al. 1997).7
This argument does not mean that adaptation can obviate the need for abatement,
especially since adaptation is more difficult for less managed ecological resources, but only
that an accurate assessment of risks and damage costs requires an accurate assessment of
potential adaptation by self-interested parties (Smith et al. 1995, Toman and Bierbaum 1996).
Another critical element that needs to be highlighted in empirical work on adaptation potential
is the role of different kinds of infrastructure--a knowledge base about the risks, general
technical facility, the extent of human capacity to exploit scientific and technical knowledge,
and the functioning of institutions for resource management and public health.  Studies of
adaptation potential explicitly or implicitly rely upon these social assets.  However, the lack
of adequate infrastructure is already recognized as an impediment to adaptation, especially in
poorer countries which are arguably more vulnerable to climate change.  A sharper empirical
understanding of the roles of different infrastructure components will increase the potential to
enhance adaptive capacity through economic and other policies that nurture the necessary
infrastructure, including institutional changes that will lower adaptation costs.8
4. ASSESSING GHG ABATEMENT COSTS:  THE "ENERGY EFFICIENCY GAP"
Debate has raged for years about the extent to which there are low-cost options for
reducing fossil energy use because market failures.  This debate is highlighted in the IPCC
Second Assessment, which states that energy efficiency improvements on the order of 10-
30% might be possible at little cost or even with net benefits, even while most "top-down"
economic models indicate a significant cost for stabilizing or cutting OECD emissions below
1990 levels (see Hourcade et al. 1996b).  More recently, several National Laboratories in the
United States have released a "bottom-up" report indicating that US domestic emissions
reductions on the order needed to meet the Kyoto Protocol could be achieved at very modest
                                               
7 For example, the last of these studies shows how adaptive forest management (such as salvage cutting of
stressed trees, reseeding with better-adapted species, and plantation cultivation) and international trade both are
likely to buffer the negative impacts of climate change on forest yields.
8 World Bank (1992, 1994) provides useful summaries of interrelationships among environmental problems,
patterns of economic development, and investments in infrastructure.  For other discussions of adaptation
potential and challenges see OTA (1993), Smith et al. (1996), and Jepma et al. (1996).Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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total cost through the deployment of various existing technologies and aggressive R&D
(Interlaboratory Working Group 1997).  In this study, the marginal cost of carbon reduction
may be significant (on the order of $50/tonne), but the total cost is small because of a
substantial well of low-cost or even negative-cost options.  A similarly optimistic conclusion
is reached by Krause (1996).
The basic theoretical dimensions of this debate as it applies to the United States and
other advanced market economies are well established (see, for example, Sutherland 1991,
Grubb et al. 1993, Sanstad and Howarth 1994, Jaffe and Stavins 1994, 1995, Hourcade et al.
1996a).9  Market failures in the choice of energy efficiency could arise because of liquidity
constraints, moral hazard problems (landlords rather than tenants pay utility bills, managerial
reward structures may be suboptimal), shortages and asymmetries of information, existing
regulatory distortions, and other factors.  If these market failures can be reduced, then low-
cost emissions reductions can be achieved.  On the other hand, comparisons of an engineering
ideal for a particular energy use to average practice for existing technology are inherently
misleading because of "hidden costs" that reflect not only buyer reactions to product attributes
but also the real-world costs of improving institutional performance and reward structures.
At this point there is an urgent need for further and more detailed empirical work that
can help clarify influences on technology choices, including those potentially associated with
market failures.  The micro-level work by Newell et al. (1998) on the relative influences of
prices, information campaigns, and direct regulation on specific choices of energy-using
equipment, and the attempts by DeCanio (1994) to analyze micro-level firm decisionmaking,
are recent examples.10  Another important question pertains to the persistence of low-cost
energy reduction opportunities over time.  Even if one did accept the view reported in the
Second Assessment that cheap 10-30% reductions were possible, would these opportunities
persist?  Or is it more likely that if they do exist, they are more like a one-shot windfall that
cannot be repeated as GHG reductions continue to be enforced?  The latter seems more
plausible if one argues that any existing "low fruit" results from low market and regulatory
incentives to promote energy efficiency.  If this is the case, it would imply that the higher
long-term abatement costs indicated by top-down models may not be so wide of the mark.
As the IPCC Second Assessment notes, in the economies in transition and in many
developing countries, there may be greater potential for low-cost improvements in energy
efficiency because of a legacy of economic distortions (see also Chandler and Evans 1996,
and Halnaes 1996).  Large subsidies to energy production and use are often singled out, along
with legacies of over-industrialization in centrally planned economies (and failure to
                                               
9 A number of more specific studies also have been published, particularly in Energy Policy and the Energy
Journal.
10 One of the ways the Interlaboratory Working Group study attempted to describe greater attentiveness to
available technological opportunities is by lowering the "hurdle rate" for energy-saving investments by more
than half when carbon controls were assumed to be employed.  This is an ad hoc approach that largely assumes
the answer and highlights the need for deeper analysis.Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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adequately address conventional environmental externalities).  While these points no doubt
are true, their importance may shrink over time as formerly planned economies restructure
and energy subsidies continue to be squeezed out.  At the same time, regulatory and other
institutional barriers to the diffusion of improved technology into developing and transitional
economies have received relatively less attention in economic analyses and warrant deeper
consideration (Blackman and Wu 1997 illustrates this kind of analysis).
5. INCENTIVES FOR TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND THE COSTS OF GHG
ABATEMENT
Whereas the energy efficiency gap is concerned primarily with the use of existing
technology, it is widely agreed that technical innovation is the ultimate key to successful
(meaning affordable as well as quantitatively adequate) global measures to stabilize the
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere.  Economists' general understanding of the forces
that drive the discovery and development of new technologies remains limited.  This is
demonstrated by the use of ad hoc "autonomous energy efficiency improvement" rates in
many top-down economic models.  These rates represent exogenous trends in energy
efficiency improvement that occur independently of energy price and other economic signals.
Beyond this general point, a second important dimension is that induced innovation
directed toward reduced GHG emissions may have indirect opportunity costs:  if the supply of
innovative effort is less than infinitely elastic, which seems reasonable to assume, then
increased innovation in GHG reduction necessarily will make other innovation more expensive
and thus crowd it out to some extent.  This in turn will reduce long-term economic growth
prospects, and raise the long-term cost of GHG abatement (Goulder and Schneider 1998).11
In addition to better understanding these basic issues in the economics of innovation,
there is a need for additional work on how different abatement policies may affect incentives
for innovation.12  For example, a fixed emissions tax rate can have a more powerful effect on
innovation incentives than a tradable permits system with allocated initial endowments, since
innovation reduces the equilibrium permit price and erodes the value of permit holdings.  But
if permits are auctioned the incentives for innovation can be enhanced, since the drop in the
equilibrium permit price lowers total payments in the auction.  The degree of appropriability
of economic rent from an abatement innovation also affects incentives.
                                               
11 To avoid confusion, it is important to note that if existing rates of investment in GHG-reducing technologies
are too low, for example because of the usual concerns about appropriability, then GHG abatement policies that
stimulate technical change will help to reduce this R&D market failure as well as addressing the environmental
challenge of GHGs.  The general equilibrium argument put forward by Goulder and Schneider points out that
these combined gains must be compared to the consequences of any reduced R&D investment elsewhere in the
economy (where rates may also be below the social optimum before the imposition of GHG policies) as well as
to the direct costs of climate-related R&D.
12 More recent work in this area that builds on Milliman and Prince (1989) includes Jaffe and Stavins (1995),
Parry (1995b, 1997), and Jung et al. (1996).Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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6. OTHER CONTINUING CHALLENGES IN GHG ABATEMENT COST ANALYSIS
There is a large published and "gray" literature on the economic costs of meeting
various targets and timetables for greenhouse gas (GHG) control, especially for the United
states.13  A wide variety of top-down modeling platforms have been used, from macro
forecasting systems to computable general equilibrium models.  This literature increasingly
underscores the importance of both general equilibrium and multinational analysis.  The
importance of general equilibrium analysis at a national level is in the ability to better capture
the many direct and indirect impacts of GHG abatement policies, which elevate the social cost
of control compared to partial equilibrium calculations of direct expenditures (Hazilla and
Kopp 1990).
The importance of multinational analysis is that national policies to restrict GHG
emissions necessarily will alter terms of trade among different countries.  These terms of trade
effects will have a variety of real and monetary consequences, including changes in capital
flows and exchange rates, that will have further economic ramifications and ramifications for
the scale and location of GHG emissions (the "leakage" issue).  While a number of models
incorporate trade in energy goods, and many incorporate trade in other goods as well, the next
challenge is to more fully integrate capital flows.14
Another important opportunity for advancement of policy-relevant knowledge
concerns the "double dividend" resulting from interaction between climate policies and
existing taxes (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994, Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, Goulder 1995,
Parry 1995a, Parry et al. 1997, Welsch 1996).  Most empirical analysis of these interactions
focus mainly on full-employment economies like the US.  Less is understood empirically
about double dividends in underemployment economies, or about tax interaction effects
associated with command-and-control policies.  There is also a need for further assessment of
the distributional implications of double dividend policies and their political economy.15
Finally, a concern arises in addressing the cost of abating multiple GHGs.  In principle
the greater flexibility available with a more comprehensive approach should reduce cost.
However, there is considerable ongoing dispute about the appropriate economic weights for
trading off abatement of gases with different lifetimes and warming potentials (Stewart and
Wiener 1992, Reilly and Richards 1993, Hammitt et al. 1996).
                                               
13 See Hourcade et al. (1996b) and Repetto and Austin (1997) for surveys; for recent analyses see, e.g., IAT
(1997), Edmonds et al. (1997), Bernstein et al. (1997), Jacoby et al. (1997), Manne and Richels (1996),
McKibbon and Wilcoxen (1995), and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1995).
14 To illustrate, the "G-Cubed" model being developed for USEPA by Peter Wilcoxen and Warren McKibbon
indicates that when developing countries do not participate in GHG reductions, they may indeed benefit at the
expense of industrialized countries that do; but the benefit may result from capital inflows triggered by changes
in exchange rates and real interest rates, not by the "leakage" of more energy-intensive industry out of Annex 1
countries.
15 Yet another dividend needing further study is the value of reduced conventional pollutants resulting from
curbs on GHGs; Burtraw and Toman (1997) provide a recent survey and assessment of these potential benefits.Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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7. FLEXIBILITY VERSUS STRINGENCY--CREATION OF CREDIBLE AND
COST-EFFECTIVE ABATEMENT POLICIES OVER SPACE AND TIME
There is an inherent tradeoff between the stringency of a policy target and the
flexibility with which this target is pursued:  the more flexible and cost-effective are the
means pursued, the more affordable are the ends.  This observation motivates the search for
ways to enhance the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of policy options, while preserving
credibility of the policies in achieving whatever targets are determined.  Flexibility can be
enhanced in the timing of emissions reductions, as already noted, and in where emissions
reductions are carried out and by whom.
An important challenge to the use of intertemporal flexibility in abatement is that in a
world in which binding intertemporal contracts across governments are impossible to write,
and binding long-term regulatory contracts with private agents are difficult to enforce, there is
a challenge in avoiding perpetual delay in emissions reduction that thwarts the long-term
environmental goal.  Put another way, if backloading is thought of as borrowing GHG
emissions from the future, how does one ensure that the carbon debt is not defaulted on?  The
first step in attacking this problem is formulating a model of dynamically consistent public and
private decisions without intertemporal forcing contracts.  The second step is devising ways in
which commitments to future carbon reductions might be made more intertemporally credible,
for example through investments that seek to induce cost-reducing technical innovation which
makes it easier for future decisionmakers to accept more stringent emissions targets.16
Substantial potential cost savings also are possible with various forms of international
emissions trading (see, e.g., Manne and Richels 1996 and Edmonds et al. 1997).17  One
challenge in achieving such benefits in practice is that emissions trading makes explicit an
international allocation of emissions opportunities or rights (though any meaningful agreement
also involves such an allocation).  Implementation of international emissions trading also may
require at least some harmonization of both domestic GHG policies and fiscal policies.  For
example, countries seeking to auction their permits (to obtain additional revenues or to exploit
a double dividend) may fear a loss of competitiveness if other countries allocate their
allowances gratis, though the seriousness of this issue in practice is unclear.  Differences in the
domestic tax treatment of corporate income also will have implications for where international
businesses participating in an international carbon market locate or expand their activities.
Similar issues arise in developing coordinated international GHG taxation.
                                               
16 It might also be possible to maintain a revenue-raising policy over time by increasing the cost of eliminating
it--for example, by dedicating the revenue to funding social insurance programs.
17 There is also an active area of research concerned with how a domestic cap-and-trade system for GHG
emissions would be constructed.  For example, would it be "upstream" or "downstream?"  How would an auction
for GHG permits be designed; how would gratis allocations be pursued?  This is a hugely important issue in the
United States, with a rapidly growing literature, but in the interest of conserving some space I do not develop
these ideas further here.  Stavins (1997) provides an overview of some of these issues from both domestic and
international perspectives; see also Toman and Shogren (forthcoming).Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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Credibility issues also arise in connection with participation in GHG trading by parties
in countries whose total emissions are not capped.18  In the absence of national emissions
caps in the host country, it is unclear whether net emissions are reduced or emissions are just
displaced (another form of emissions "leakage").  Complex procedures have been proposed
for calculating the "additionality" of emission reductions in such projects (see, e.g., Carter
1997), but the incentive effects of these procedures are not yet well understood.  Moreover,
even if there was no uncertainty about the net emissions reductions conditional on project
completion, asymmetric information and the potential for contract breach or opportunistic
behavior create potentially significant uncertainties about the outcomes of such projects.
Problems of these types all fall under the general heading of optimal contracting and agency
relationships.  However, this powerful set of theoretical tools is just beginning to be brought
to bear on JI issues (Hagem 1996, Nannerup and Steiner 1997).  These analyses need to be
expanded and joined with institutional and legal analyses of GHG trading issues (see, e.g.,
Tietenberg and Victor 1994 and Stewart et al. 1996).
8. INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Because climate change is a canonical example of a collective action problem--actions
within each country affect welfare in all countries, and effective responses require a large
degree of international participation--climate change also is a canonical example of the
difficulties of achieving effective collective action noted by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).
Since that classic paper, and especially in the past 10 years, a large literature using concepts
from noncooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze the negotiation of coalitions for
GHG abatement has developed (see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 1994, Hoel and
Schneider 1997).  These studies have highlighted the conflicting incentives in the formation
of effective coalitions.  For example, when the benefits from forming a large coalition are
substantial, the incentives to stay with the coalition also may be weak; the presence of side
payments can help ameliorate this problem.19
Simple models abstract from the fact that international relations are affected by actions
on a number of issues at once, leading to linkage between climate and other environmental
and economic issues.  The treatment of countries as unitary actors in simple models also
sidesteps the complex hierarchy of relationships between government representatives and
                                               
18 These programs used to be referred to as "joint implementation," but the Kyoto Protocol created a new label,
the "Clean Development Mechanism."
19 Burtraw and Toman (1992) use a heuristic bargaining framework to suggest that simple rules of thumb for
sharing the benefits and costs of GHG reduction measures are unlikely a priori to command adequate support to
form a basis for international agreement.  Rose and Stevens (1993) analyze different equity principles in the
context of an international trading system; Rose and Tietenberg (1993) consider the consequences for economic
development of international trading.Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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interest groups, both domestically and internationally.  Current research in this area is
loosening these strictures, but there is substantial room for further progress.20
Another important and promising research area looks at different possibilities for
"graduation" of developing countries into the coalition of countries that have accepted some
form of national emissions constraint.  One way to do this is to simply offer enough wealth
transfer through an initial allocation of tradable emission credits that the developing countries
are induced to join.  However, this is quite likely to be unacceptable in practice to the
industrialized countries.  This leads in turn to consideration of various second-best
approaches, where developing countries gradually assume greater responsibility as their per
capita incomes rise.  Various proposals include staggered participation in emissions
stabilization and reduction targets, with the possibility of eventually converging to equal per-
capita emissions levels (for illustrative analyses see Edmonds et al. 1995 and Manne and
Richels 1997)
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The research agenda implied by my priority list emphasizes expanding empirical
understanding as well as utilizing contemporary theoretical advances such as the economics
of agency and contracts and the analysis of dynamic consistency issues.  It also is an agenda
which emphasizes both short-term and longer-term studies.  Continuation and enhancement of
current research activities, if adequately supported by the appropriate national and
international authorities, could yield new and useful insights for decisionmakers in the
relatively short term.  In other cases, though, basic factual uncertainties--in particular, about
climate change risks and possibilities for adaptation--also need to be reduced.
                                               
20 Ulph and Maddison (1997) illustrate another interesting extension by showing that in some cases, the value of
improved information about climate change risks with multiple national decisionmakers could be negative.Michael Toman RFF 98-32
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